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Skepticism, Dogmatism and the Future of Liberalism 
 
Contemporary postmodernists pride themselves on their awareness of the impossibility of 
genuine knowledge, and hence of “foundations” for our moral and political beliefs. They 
look with condescension towards the naiveté of past thinkers who believed in the 
accessibility of truth – as exemplified by Aristotle’s “teleological” view of the universe or 
the assertion of “self-evident” truths in the Declaration of Independence. 
 
Such condescension, when directed at the philosophers of antiquity and early modernity, 
is doubly misplaced. It entails a superficial reading of the greatest classical philosophers. 
And it rests on a new form of dogmatism – that is, dogmatic skepticism or relativism – 
that is truly naïve, being the unreflective offshoot of a public teaching advanced by 
certain early modern philosophers as part of their enterprise of liberating humanity from 
Christian theocracy, but one the limitations of which they fully recognized. 
 
 My primary witness for both the foregoing claims will be Michel de Montaigne, whose 
Essays (1580-1592) was one of the most important and influential texts of early modern 
philosophy, particularly as a source of the skepticism elaborated by such writers as Locke 
and Descartes. Montaigne is often viewed as a pre-eminent skeptic who challenged the 
ostensibly dogmatic character of classical, pre-modern philosophy. He is thought to have 
grounded his skepticism in the doctrines of an ancient philosophic sect, the Pyrrhonians, 
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who denied the possibility of knowledge.1 However, this interpretation overlooks the 
subtlety of Montaigne’s account of Pyrrhonism in his “Apology for Raymond Sebond” 
(Essays II.12), which suggests that all the ancient philosophers were skeptics in the 
original, Socratic sense – being aware of the uncertainty of all human beliefs. Moreover, 
underneath a surface of mockery, Montaigne praises the philosophers as the greatest of 
human benefactors. The seeming dogmatism of Plato and Aristotle, he explains, was only 
a mask they donned to avoid being punished for their heterodoxy and unbelief – and in 
order to have a morally salutary effect on the nonphilosophic multitude (II.12, 481 [371], 
487-93 [375-80]).2 In his subsequent catalogues in II.12 of the philosophers’ various and 
seemingly ludicrous doctrines about the gods and the human soul, he expresses doubt that 
they were “speaking in earnest” about such things; they concealed their ignorance to 
accommodate “public usage” and to avoid “frighten[ing] the children” (498 [384]; 527 
[408]). 
 
That Montaigne was not a serious advocate of the Pyrrhonian form of skepticism – which 
reportedly led its founder to deny (for instance) the existence of a cart that was about to 
hit him, compelling his followers to save him – he indicates through subtle mockery 
elsewhere in the Essays (II.29, 83-4 [533]).3 What more fundamentally distinguishes 
Montaigne from his predecessors among the political philosophers such as Plato and 
Aristotle, he suggests, is rather his openly proclaiming his skepticism – even while 
covering its political and antitheological implications with just enough pretense of 
submission to ecclesiastic authority to avoid being punished for his heterodoxy. Indeed, 
in his chapter on “The Education of Children,” he emphasizes the desirability of 
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encouraging youth to question all accepted doctrines, with specific reference to 
conventional religious beliefs – thus indicating the effect that Montaigne intended the 
Essays as a whole to have on its readers (I.26, 150 [111]).4 
 
However, as Montaigne’s periodic remarks about the distinction between men of truly 
philosophic capacity like himself and most human beings (e.g., II.12, 481 [377]) indicate, 
his project of disseminating a popularized skepticism is not grounded in a belief that most 
people are capable of (or interested in) achieving philosophic understanding. Rather, 
anticipating Nietzsche’s description of Christianity as “Platonism for the people,”5 he 
blames the classical political philosophers’ public stance for generating “edifying” myths 
that issued in the evils of theocracy, religious persecution, and civil war. He endeavors to 
replace that public teaching with a new one that will direct people away from the quest 
for transcendence, by making them fully “at home” in the terrestrial world with its 
pleasures. This entails “debunking” religious claims more openly than his classical 
predecessors chose, or dared, to do. And he denounces as well the philosophers’ 
hypocritical enunciation of ascetic moral teachings, in contrast with the sensual 
indulgence in which they engaged behind the scenes: their “natural” way of life was one 
of hedonism, restricted only by “moderation and respect for others’ liberty” (II.12, 567-8 
[440-1]; III.9, 968-9 [757], III.10, 983 [769]).  
 
Montaigne’s popularized form of skepticism does not issue in an outright relativism, 
however. Rather, from the fact of the inevitable diversity of human opinions about the 
“sovereign good,” combined with the fact of our undeniable sensitivity to bodily pleasure 
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and pain, he derives the formula for liberalism: “since philosophy has not been able to 
find a way to tranquility that is suitable to all, let everyone seek it individually” (II.12, 
561 [435]; II.16, 605-6 [471]).6 His argument ultimately underlies the modern, Lockean 
doctrine of natural rights, according to which government has only the limited purpose of 
enabling individuals to enjoy the security of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” 
rather than seeking to impose a higher vision of the purpose of life on them.  
 
Despite Montaigne’s rejection of the classical political philosophers’ public posture, there 
is a deeper link between his own form of skepticism (as distinguished from his public 
rhetoric) and that which characterized classical philosophy as a whole, but which sets him 
apart from the Pyrrhonian skeptics. As Montaigne observes, the Pyrrhonians’ aim was a 
condition of tranquility, or “ataraxy,” resulting from liberating oneself from “the 
agitations” generated by our claims to knowledge (II.12, 483 [372]). Their goal was an 
essentially passive one – in contrast to the never-ending pursuit of wisdom in which 
Montaigne depicts himself as engaged. And whereas it is the essence of philosophy to 
weigh all opinions open-mindedly, and to welcome challenges to one’s preconceptions as 
an aid to one’s pursuit of knowledge (III.8, 900-902 [704-5]), Montaigne’s portrayal of 
the Pyrrhonians goes beyond this, representing them as gamesters who would maintain 
the opposite of any proposition that was put before them, just to “create doubt and 
suspension of judgment” (483 [372]). Far from embracing their teaching, Montaigne 
acknowledges that the Pyrrhonians’ determined refusal to commit themselves to any 
opinion, even provisionally – including the opinion that we are necessarily ignorant – 
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makes the doctrine “difficult to conceive,” especially since its authors “represent it rather 
obscurely and diversely” (485 [374]). 
 
As Montaigne depicts the Pyrrhonians, far from being thoroughgoing skeptics, they 
appear to have been dogmatically committed to a doctrine or at least an attitude of their 
own, which no observation or argument could shake. By contrast, the outlook and way of 
life that Montaigne expresses in much of the Essays is a zetetic skepticism, one that 
generates endless inquiry in pursuit of greater understanding, rather than resting content 
with the awareness of one’s ignorance (III.13, 1045 [817-18]). In this fundamental 
respect, Montaigne is faithful to the original philosophic way of life exemplified by 
Socrates (III.8, 903 [705]).7  
 
Montaigne’s dedication to the continued pursuit of learning is manifest not only in the 
abundance of classical quotations that fill the Essays, and in his accounts of his 
enjoyment of philosophic conversation and “association” with books in III.3 and III.8, but 
also in specific remarks in II.12 and III.13 holding out the prospect of infinite future 
scientific progress (II.12, 543 [421]; III.13, 1045 [817]). It is paradoxical, of course, that 
an author who stresses the uncertainty of our judgment and our incapacity to penetrate the 
essences of things (II.12, 545, 547-8 [422, 424-5]) should express such hopes. The 
explanation of this paradox is that Montaigne espouses a new doctrine about nature that 
subsequently came to underlie the modern scientific quest: the view that since we cannot 
assume that we have access to the “real” natures of things, but can know only their 
sensible properties, we are free to reconstruct the objects we encounter – both in thought 
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and ultimately in practice – with a view to better understanding nature’s mode of 
operation (II.12, 545 [422]). The ultimate fruit of this enterprise is a new science of 
“medicine,” broadly understood (II, xxxvii, 745 [581]), that will generate what 
Montaigne’s successor Francis Bacon would call “the relief of man’s estate.”8  
Why should all this matter to us today? Academic thinking is now dominated by a more 
radical sort of skepticism or relativism than Montaigne espoused, one that treats the 
principles of liberalism itself as ultimately groundless. “Pragmatic” theorists like John 
Dewey, followed more recently by postmodernists like Richard Rorty, maintain that such 
relativism is actually supportive of liberalism, since awareness of the relativity of all 
perspectives should deter us from imposing our views on other people.  
 
But liberal postmodernism is a delusion. From the supposed fact of the relativity of all 
perspectives, it does not follow that I should tolerate other people’s views and ways of 
life rather than engage in a Nietzschean struggle to impose my will on them. The regime 
of liberal toleration entailed by the Declaration of Independence is unlikely to survive the 
sort of relativistic assault that regards it as in no sense objectively superior to, say, 
jihadism.  
 
To discern potentially antiliberal consequences in Rorty’s doctrine is not to refute it. But 
Rorty stacks the deck in his favor by suggesting that the only alternative to an “ironism” 
that treats all moral and political beliefs as historically “contingent” is a dogmatic 
“metaphysical” demand that such beliefs be regarded as beyond question.9  
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In fact, it is Rorty, not the philosophic critics of historicism and relativism, who proves to 
be dogmatic. This point is illustrated by his mode of upholding the proposition that 
liberalism should avoid distinguishing “between absolutism and relativism, between 
rationality and irrationality, and between morality and expediency.” Citing the parallels 
between his position and Isaiah Berlin’s championing of “negative liberty” against what 
Rorty calls “telic conceptions of human perfection,” Rorty proceeds to defend Berlin’s 
favorable citation of Joseph Schumpeter’s dictum that a “civilized man” is distinguished 
from a “barbarian” by his capacity “to realise the relative validity of [his] conceptions yet 
stand for them unflinchingly” against Michael Sandel’s criticism. In response to Sandel’s 
observation of the “relativist predicament” which that remark exemplifies, Rorty 
contends that “it would be better to avoid using the term ‘only relatively valid’ to 
characterize the state of mind of the figures whom Schumpeter, Berlin, and I wish to 
praise.” In other words, “the claim that Berlin’s position is ‘relativistic’ … should not be 
answered, but rather evaded.”10 Such evasion hardly seems consistent with the open-
mindedness that we normally associate with the term “liberalism” – let alone with 
philosophy. 
 
Rorty’s mode of supporting liberalism was hardly peculiar to him. Rather, it was the tack 
taken by the most celebrated Anglo-American academic writer on political philosophy of 
the past half-century, John Rawls, who defended his “theory of justice” against the 
criticism that it merely summarized the tenets of a particular ideology, or set of political 
preferences, by explaining that it was “political not metaphysical” – in other words, it 
made no claim to objective truth, but simply constituted a statement of the principles that 
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“we” (Rawls and those who thought like him) found “intuitively” appealing.11 That 
position – a professedly foundationless liberalism – was more fully developed in Rawls’s 
1993 book Political Liberalism. The move proved highly attractive to other liberals who 
sought “authoritative” confirmation for their opinions without having to subject them to 
rational assessment.12 
 
An interesting anticipation of Rorty’s and Rawls’s posture can be seen in Socrates’ 
eponymous interlocutor in Plato’s Meno. In that dialogue Meno, having had his ignorance 
exposed by Socrates, labels the philosopher a “torpedo-fish” for numbing or 
“bewitching” him with dialectical examination, and warns of the punishment he may 
incur should he practice his art outside Athens. (The warning is made in the presence of 
Anytus, one of Socrates’ three future legal accusers.) In an attempt to forestall any 
continuance of their joint inquiry, Meno then propounds his celebrated paradox, 
according to which it is impossible to seek knowledge of something when you don’t 
know what it is to begin with.13 
 
Psychologically, the professorial Rorty and Rawls would appear to have little in common 
with the notorious Meno. But Rorty’s disdain for rationalism and “objectivity,” and 
Rawls’s wish to dispense with any attempt to ground justice in some account of human 
nature, serve the same function as Meno’s paradox: to safeguard their political 
assumptions against rational critique. The core difference between Meno and Rorty is that 
whereas Meno wished to foreclose philosophic examination outright, Rorty would first 
inculcate the public with his own doctrine of “ironism” or “historicism,” and then 
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preclude further examination. The adoption of Rorty’s position would entail the death of 
philosophy as a meaningful rather than trivial enterprise (reminiscent of the Pyrrhonians’ 
game-playing).  
 
All this is not to deny, however, that the postmoderns have uncovered a fundamental 
difficulty in the original, liberal-skeptical doctrine. The partial skepticism, directed 
against “transcendental” doctrines, that Montaigne publicly espoused (as distinguished 
from the zetetic skepticism, reflecting the love of knowledge, that characterized his own 
way of life) ultimately proved to be an intellectually vulnerable halfway house. Although 
the history of religious persecution and civil war that culminated in Montaigne’s time 
would appear to justify his project of human liberation from the quest for transcendence, 
in the long run it proved impossible to divert humanity from that quest – so that fanatical 
religious doctrines were replaced, over the past two centuries, with no less fanatical 
secular, totalitarian ideologies. In a world that includes antiliberal peoples and regimes 
that are as convinced as Meno or Anytus of the objective rightness of their positions, 
mere skepticism provides little support for liberalism. It is doubtful that human beings 
can be persuaded to make the sacrifices necessary to perpetuate the liberal constitutional 
order if they believe it is grounded in nothing grander than the quest for comfortable self-
preservation.14 
 
Awareness of these problems should cause us to reassess the possibility of philosophy in 
its original form – an enterprise that, while appreciating the uncertainty of all beliefs, sees 
that as an incentive to pursue genuine knowledge; and yet is more modest than 
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Montaigne in its attitude towards conventional moral beliefs. Speaking politically, it 
would encourage an appreciation of Alexis de Tocqueville’s account in Democracy in 
America of the potential harmony between political liberty and the moderate religious 
belief which grounds the moral principles that liberty presupposes. 
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